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The Secret Life of the Trust:
The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce
John H. Langbein'
In the culture of Anglo-American law, we think of the trust as a branch
of the law of gratuitous transfers. That is where we teach trusts in the law
school curriculum,' that is where we locate trusts in the statute books,- and
that is where American lawyers typically encounter the trust in their practice.
The trust originated at the end of the Middle Ages as a means of transferring
wealth within the family,' and the trust remains our characteristic device for
organizing intergenerational wealth transmission when the transferor has
substantial assets or complex family affairs. In the succinct formulation of
Bernard Rudden, Anglo-American lawyers regard the trust as "essentially a
gift, projected on the plane of time and so subjected to a management
regime."4
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The Restatement (Second) of Trusti, the most authoritative exposition of
American trust law, exemplifies our tradition of thinking about the trust
exclusively as a branch of the law of gratuitous transfers. Austin W. Scott, the
reporter, excluded commercial trusts from the Restatement on the ground that
"many of the rules" of trust law are inapplicable in commercial settings.5 Scott
offered no support for that claim,6 which is mistaken. The familiar standards
of trust fiduciary law protect trust beneficiaries of all sorts, regardless of
whether the trust implements a gift or a business deal (unless, of course, the
terms of the transaction expressly contraindicate). Indeed, one of the great
attractions of the trust for the transaction planner who is designing a business
deal is the convenience of being able to absorb these standards into the ground
rules for the deal, merely by invoking the trust label.
Scott carried his disdain for commercial trusts into his treatise, refusing to
speak of them.' George G. Bogert, the other leading American treatise writer
on trusts, was more tolerant; his book supplies introductory (although now
quite antiquated) coverage of some types of commercial trust.'
My theme in this Essay is that the American legal intellectual tradition,
which characterizes the trust as a branch of the law of gratuitous transfers, is
at odds with the reality of American trust practice. In truth, most of the wealth
that is held in trust in the United States is placed there incident to business
deals, and not in connection with gratuitous transfers. It will be seen that well
over 90% of the money held in trust in the United States is in commercial
trusts as opposed to personal trusts.
In Part I of this Essay I undertake to identify and categorize the principal
types of commercial trust that are currently employed in the United States. Part
II points to the attributes of the trust that make it attractive as an instrument
of commerce. Part III offers some thoughts about the puzzling neglect of the
commercial trust in our juristic tradition-why, that is, we so resolutely
conceive of the trust as a mode of gift, even while we employ it ever more as
an instrument of commerce.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 1 cmt. b (1959). The full text of the passage reads:
A statement of the rules of law relating to the employment of a trust as a device for carrying
on business is not within the scope of the Restatement of this Subject. Although many of the
rules applicable to trusts are applied to business trusts, yet many of the rules are not applied,
and there are other rules which are applicable only to business trusts. The business trust is a
special kind of business association and can best be dealt with in connection with other business
associations.
Id.
6. Neither the text of the Restatement's official comment, nor the reporter's note, supplies any
authority for Scott's claim that "many of the rules" of trust law do not apply to business uses of the trust.
7. See I AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.2, at 40 (4th ed.
1987) (excluding "the so-called business trust or Massachusetts trust").
8. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§§ 247-251, 255 (rev. 2d ed. 1992) (introducing business trusts, investment and real estate trusts, bond
indenture trusts, and pension trusts).
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I touched upon the subject of commercial trusts in an earlier article in the
Yale Law Journal, discussing the contractarian basis of trust law.9 I observed
that even conventional donative trusts have a contract-like character, in the
agreement between trustee and settlor about the terms of the trust."0 Trust and
third party beneficiary contract are the closest of substitutes. The commercial
trust, because it arises in a business setting and lacks all donative purpose, is
the easiest case for the view that trusts are deals. The present Essay directs
attention to a very different question-not whether commercial trusts are deals,
but why deal-makers choose the trust form.
I. VARIETIES OF COMMERCIAL TRUSTS IN THE UNITED STATES
A word about definitions: When I speak of a commercial trust, I refer to
a trust that implements bargained-for exchange, in contrast to a donative
transfer. Accordingly, I exclude the charitable trust from the category of
commercial trust. Charitable trusts and foundations originate as donative
transfers; they are gifts for the benefit of persons and causes beyond the
family.II
I exclude from this discussion all the various governmental budgeting
conventions that have appropriated-I am tempted to say misappropriated-the
trust label. Things such as the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust
Fund, 12 the Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund, 3 or the Highway Trust
Fund 4 have, at best, only a metaphorical connection to actual trust
practice.' 5 They are, however, ubiquitous. A computer search of state statutes
turned up 677 purported trust funds in Florida alone, 6 including the Citrus
Advertising Trust Fund,' 7 the Quarter Horse Racing Promotion Trust Fund,'8
and the Florida Law Review Trust Fund.' 9
I also exclude from my account of commercial trusts some activities such
as the administration of bankrupt or decedents' estates, in which the
nomenclature of trusts and trustees appears, but without the substance.
9. See Langbein, supra note 3.
10. See id. at 627-28, 650, 657-60.
11. The assets of charitable trusts and foundations are consolidated with those of personal trusts for
federal reporting purposes, in FEDERAL FIN. INSTS. EXAMiNATION CouNcnL. TRUST ASSETS OF FINANCIAL
INSTrrTIONS-1994 (1995) [hereinafter TRUST AssETs1. On the choice between trust and corporate form
for the conduct of charity, see infra note 135 and accompanying text; on the character of charitable
purposes, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959).
12. 26 U.S.C. § 9508 (1994).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 14211 (1994).
14. 26 U.S.C. § 9503 (1994).
15. For example, federal law requires that such funds limit their "investing" to -buying" federal
government paper. 26 U.S.C. § 9602 (1994).
16. Search of WESTLAW, FL-ST-ANN Database (Sept. 1, 1997) (search for records containing
"regulation" and "trust fund").
17. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 601.15(7) (Harrison 1978 & Supp. 1996).
18. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.20(4)') (Harrison Supp. 1996).
19. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.276 (Harrison Supp. 1996).
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Bankruptcy only infrequently leads to the appointment of a trustee.2" Unlike
the trustee under an intentional trust, the bankruptcy trustee is essentially an
officer of the court,2 who operates under statutory authority to disregard the
terms of many of the antecedent commercial transactions that led to the
bankruptcy. For similar reasons, I exclude the work of personal representatives,
guardians, and conservators, who are held to trustee-like standards in
administering the assets of decedents' estates and of protected persons.22
Finally, I exclude for present purposes the deed of trust mechanism that
is used for transferring real property. In California and other states in which
this mode of conveyancing is prevalent, real estate finance takes the nominal
form of the trust rather than the mortgage. "This device normally involves a
conveyance of the realty to a third person in trust to hold as security for the
payment of the debt to the [lender] whose role is analogous to that of the
mortgagee."' The deed of trust, when properly drafted, is essentially
indistinguishable in function from a conventional mortgage. The so-called
trustee is a stakeholder, not a manager of the trusteed property.
I turn now from excluded categories to the task of identifying the principal
forms of commercial trust presently used in the United States.
A. Pension Trusts
The species of commercial trust that is perhaps best understood in its
relation to the personal trust is the pension trust. American pension trusts have
attained stupendous size and importance. As of year-end 1996, the assets of
American private (that is, nongovernmental) pension funds held in trust were
valued at $3 trillion.2 (These plans held nearly a further $900 billion of
assets in insurance company accounts, mostly so-called life insurance company
separate accounts, which are trusts in all but name.)' State and local pension
plans for governmental employees held another $1.6 trillion in assets, mostly
20. "Appointment of a trustee is extraordinary," requiring "clear and convincing evidence" of the
danger of fraud, gross mismanagement, or other such cause. 3 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY
§ 10-8, at 17 (1992).
21. Comparable officers serve in the nontrust legal systems of the Continent, further indication that
our tradition of calling this court functionary a trustee is a misnomer. For a capsule treatment, see
EUROPEAN BANKRUPTCY LAWS (David A. Botwinik & Kenneth W. Weinrib, American Bar Ass'n, eds.,
2d ed. 1986).
22. The Uniform Probate Code treats the personal representative as "a fiduciary who shall observe the
standards of care applicable to trustees," UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-703 (1993), and it requires the
conservator to "act as a fiduciary and observe the standards of care applicable to trustees," id. § 5-416.
23. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANcE LAW § 1.6, at 11 (3d ed. 1994).
Trust-based conveyancing is also common in England, although for other reasons. See, e.g., ANOELA
SYDENHAM, TRUSTS OF LAND (1996).
24. See PENSION INVESTMENT REPORT-IST QUARTER 1997 (Employee Benefit Research Inst.,
Washington, D.C.), July 1997, at 29 tbl.13 [hereinafter PENSION INVESTMENT REPORT] (on file with the
Yale Law Journal).
25. See id. On the trust-like character of life insurance separate accounts, see Langbein, supra note
3, at 668-69.
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in trust form.' 6 American pension funds own more than a quarter of
American equities and about half of all corporate debt.27
The pension trust arises from the contract of employment, providing for
deferred compensation to be paid in retirement. The Employee Retirement
Income Security Act2s (ERISA), the pension regulatory law enacted in 1974,
imposes a rule of mandatory trusteeship, requiring that "all assets of an
employee benefit plan shall be held in trust. ' 29 (There is an exception for plan
assets that take the form of insurance contracts.) 30 Actually, the federal policy
of promoting the trust form for pension funds is older than ERISA. As far
back as 1921, the Internal Revenue Code effectively required pension funds to
utilize the trust form (unless the plan assets were entirely invested in insurance
contracts).3 In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act"2 imposed a similar requirement
for collectively bargained multiemployer pension plans. 33
Of the varieties of commercial trust that I discuss in this Essay, only the
pension trust has been much assimilated to conventional trust law. ERISA
codifies the central principles of trust fiduciary law,3 and ERISA's legislative
history makes clear that Congress meant to track the common law of trusts.
35
Thus, agencies and courts interpreting and applying ERISA have inclined to
rely upon the Restatement of Trusts and upon the major trust-law treatises. In
turn, the updaters of these authorities have tended to collect the decisions of
courts that cite them. Another reason that it has been easier to relate pension
trusts to personal trusts is that most pension plans, in addition to facilitating
retirement saving for the worker, provide for the transfer of undistributed
26. See PENSION INVESTmENT REPORT, supra note 24. at 29 tbl 13
27. Data is collected in JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK. PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEPrr
LAW 20 (2d ed. 1995).
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1000-1461 (1994).
29. ERISA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103. In drafting ERISA the congressional conference committee
explained that it wanted to "apply rules and remedies similar to those under traditional trust law to govern
the conduct of [ERISA] fiduciaries." H.R. REi,. No. 93-1280 (1974). reprinted in 1974 U S.C C AN, 5038.
5076.
30. See ERISA § 403(b)(l)-(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(l)-(2). The Internal Revenue Code is in accord
with this exception. See I.R.C. §§ 403(a), 404(a)(2) (1994) (stating that the requirement of mandatory
trusteeship does not pertain to a plan funded exclusively by insurance or annuity contracts)
31. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 219(0. 42 Stat. 227, 247 (codified as amended at I R C §
401(a) (1994)) (insisting upon the use of the trust as a condition of what we now call -qualifying" a
pension plan for tax benefits).
32. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act. ch. 120,61 Stat 136 (1947) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-167, 171-187, 557 (1994)).
33. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 302(c)(5). 29 U S.C § 186(cXS).
34. See ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994) (codifying the principles of loyalty, prudence,
and diversification).
35. "ERISA's legislative history confirms that the Act's fiduciary responsibility provisions
'codif[y] and mak[e] applicable to (ERISAI fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the
law of trusts.'" Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101. 110 (1989) (quoting H.R REP No
93-533, at 11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639. 4649). ERISAs "fiduciary duties draw much
of their content from the common law of trusts, the law that governed most benefit plans before ERISA's
enactment." Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. CI. 1065, 1070 (1996).
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pension account balances to the worker's survivors. 6 In this respect the
pension trust exhibits a hybrid trait: Although it is a commercial trust, it
commonly gives rise to a gratuitous transfer.
B. Investment Trusts
Next to the pension trust, the most prominent category of commercial trust
is the investment trust," which exists in a variety of forms.
1. Mutual Funds
Until recent decades, the investor who wished to own stocks, bonds, or
other financial assets generally had to assemble a portfolio of individually
selected securities. Today's investor increasingly prefers to buy shares in a
pooled investment vehicle, usually a mutual fund. Investment professionals
select and manage the fund's assets, according to guidelines that define the
fund's investment objectives." The mutual fund offers expertise, economies
of scale, and a level of diversification far superior to that obtainable by the
typical investor constructing an individual portfolio. Since the 1970s, the trend
toward investing in mutual funds has become immensely important in
American financial markets. As of May 1997, American mutual funds held
nearly $4 trillion in assets.39 A mutual fund can take the form either of a
corporation, called an investment company, or of an investment trust.
36. Transfer on death of undistributed account balances pursuant to a beneficiary designation is
characteristic of defined contribution plans, see I.R.C. §§ 401(k), 403(b) (1994), as well as individual
retirement accounts (IRAs), see I.R.C. § 408 (1994). Defined benefit plans commonly make no provision
for survivor benefits other than for spouses.
Pension law also resembles conventional family wealth-transmission law in mandating spousal shares.
As amended in 1984, ERISA requires most pension benefits of a married worker to be distributed in the
form of a joint and survivor annuity for the lives of both spouses, thus transferring a portion of the
worker's retirement savings to the spouse. See ERISA § 205(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(A) (1994); I.R.C. §
401(a)(11) (1994); see also LANOBEIN & WOLK, supra note 27, at 553 (describing the ERISA spousal
entitlement as "afederal-law,.asset-specificforced-share system, a forced share for pensions").
Many forms of financially intermediated wealth may now be subject to transfer-on-death (TOD)
instructions. On the causes of this practice, see John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the
Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984). A widely enacted uniform act encourages
the use of TOD designations for securities and mutual fund accounts. See UNIF. TRANSFER ON DEATH SEc.
REGIsTRATION AcT, 8B U.L.A. 479 (1993) (codified as UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 6, pt. 3 (1993)).
37. This category obviously overlaps the pension trust in the sense that a main function of the pension
trust is to invest workers' savings for retirement. When I speak of investment trusts, however, I refer to
general-purpose vehicles, not those limited to retirement plans.
38. Regarding disclosure of fund investment policies, see 3 TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF
MONEY MANAGERS: THE INVESTMENT COMPANY AcT AND THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS Acr, ch. 24, § 8.3,
at 472-78 (1980 & Supp. 1996).
39. The precise figure is $3,904.6 billion, according to data supplied by the Investment Company
Institute (ICI), the industry's trade association. See Facsimile from Investment Company Institute (July 8,
1997) [hereinafter ICI Data Sheet] (on file with the Yale Law Journal).
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Currently, about half or more of American mutual funds take the trust form."
I shall have more to say about why."
2. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)
The real estate investment trust (REIT) is a mutual fund that invests in real
property or in mortgages on real property, or in both. Congress authorized
REITs in 1960, amending the Internal Revenue Code to allow pass-through tax
status to such trusts.42 Currently, there are 199 REITs that are nationally
traded. Their capitalization as of May 1997 was over $98 billion."
3. Oil and Gas Royalty Trusts
Another asset-specific form of investment trust, found in the oil producing
states, is the oil and gas royalty trust. Such entities are tax-driven." In a
typical transaction, a corporation that has developed an oil field (or some other
extractive asset) will transfer ownership to a trust, distributing beneficial
interests in the trust to the corporation's shareholders. As owner of the royalty-
bearing asset, the trust distributes directly to the beneficiaries of the trust the
royalty income that the trust asset generates. The beneficiaries then escape
corporate-level taxation.45 These trust interests are marketable, and a number
40. A total of 1562 of the 2345 mutual funds surveyed by ICI were organized as trusts. The ICl's data.
however, covers less than half the approximately 5900 mutual funds that report to the ICI. See Letter from
Amy Lancellotta, Associate Counsel, ICI (June II, 1996) (on file with the Yale Law Journal).
A sample of mutual funds formed during the period July 1985 through December 1987 found that
half were organized as Massachusetts business trusts and 28% as Maryland business corporations. See
Sheldon A. Jones et al., The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered Investment Companies. 13 DEL
J. CORP. L. 421, 422 (1988). On the preference for Maryland corporations, see infra text accompanying
notes 129-131, regarding the revisions to Maryland law that now allow the corporate form to approximate
more closely the advantages of the trust.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 126-135.
42. See Real Estate Investment Trusts Act, Pub. L. No. 88-272. 74 Stat. 1004 (1960) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. §§ 856-858 (1995)). In 1976 the Code was further amended to allow such real estate
investment funds to use the corporate form. For a detailed exposition of the current tax treatment of REITs.
see Steven F. Mount, Real Estate Investment Trusts, Tax MgmL Portfolios (BNA) No. 107 (1996)
43. See National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts. Document on Demand-Document #201
(visited June 25, 1997) <httpl/www.nareit.com/faxondem/201 .html>.
44. In addition to dispensing with corporate-level taxation, see infra text accompanying note 45. some
oil and gas royalty trusts are structured as tax credit royalty trusts under I.R.C. § 29 to maintain the benefits
of tax credits awarded for the production of unconventional fuels. See John L Crain et al.. Section 29 Tax
Credit Royalty Trusts: A lVin-lWin Proposition for lvestors and Oil and Gas Companies. 43 OIL & GAs
TAX Q. 295 (1994). Illustrative transactions are discussed in industry journals. See. e.g . Danielle Robinson.
Royalty Trust Is a Break for Burlington Resources, 61 PETRoLEUM EcoNoMIST 70 (1994); BP Raises $334
Million Through Sale of Royalty Interest in Prudhoe Bay Output. PLATr's Ort o.. "%l NEwS, Mar. 3. 1989.
at 2; Williams Raising Additional Cash for Further Pipeline Expansions. INSIDE F.E.R C.'s GAs MARKET
REP., Nov. 6, 1992, at 2.
45. On the mechanics, see Thomas Crichton IV, Royalty Trusts and Other Exotic Distributions to
Shareholders, I N.Y.U. FoRTETH ANN. INST. FED. TAX'N (MB), § 12.04. at 12-17 to 12-25 (Nicolas Liras
ed., 1982); and Stephan G. Dollinger & Jeanne K. Helsley. Royalty Trusts. 30 OIL & GAS TAX Q 262
(1981). For a comparison with the partnership structure, see John L. Crain et al.. A Comparison of Royalty
Trusts and Master Limited Partnerships, 36 OIL & GAs TA Q. 29 (1987).
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of the larger royalty trusts are stock-exchange traded.46
4. Asset Securitization
Asset securitization4 7 has become one of the most important commercial
uses of the trust. A large fraction of all mortgage, credit card, automobile, and
student loan debt is financed-or somewhat more accurately,
refinanced-through asset securitization trusts. I have not been able to locate
reliable data on the magnitude of asset securitization, but the sums involved
number in the trillions of dollars. Patchy Federal Reserve data shows nearly
$1.9 trillion in mortgage pools and $225 billion in automobile and other
consumer credit as of July 1996.48
Asset securitization trusts are best understood by recalling the older pattern
of bank-intermediated financing that is now being displaced by asset
securitization. Take, for example, the case of a bank that used to finance credit
card receivables in the ordinary way. These receivables are assets, debtors'
promises to pay credit card debt. The bank used to buy the receivables from
merchants, thereby placing them on the bank's books. To pay for these new
assets, the bank required additional financing. Typically, the bank borrowed
from large institutional sources-insurance companies, mutual funds, pension
funds, and so forth. These lenders acquired no ownership interest in the
underlying receivables that induced the bank to increase its borrowing. Rather,
the lenders became general creditors of the bank, and the receivables remained
as assets of the bank.
Contrast the new pattern. The bank in my example, now called the
originator or packager, buys the credit card receivables as before, but then
transfers them in trust to a separate trustee. Shares in that trust are sold to
various participating investors, who, under the new scheme, are not lenders to
the bank but share owners in the trust. Notice that I have taken a bank as my
example, but nonbank intermediaries such as General Motors Acceptance
Corporation and Caterpillar also engage in asset securitization, spinning off
46. See John L. Crain, Royalty Trusts Continue To Play Useful Role, 133 TRUSTS & ESTATES 25
(1994) (reporting more than 20 publicly traded oil and gas royalty trusts created since 1976, most of which
are still trading).
47. I follow the insightful introductory account by Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset
Securitization, I STAN. J.L. Bus. & FiN. 133 (1994); and the treatise by Tamar Frankel, see TAMAR
FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSETS POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED
SECURrriES (1991 & Supp. 1995).
48. See 82 FED. RESERVE BULL. at A35 to A36 tbls.l.54, 1.55 (1996). For a useful account of finance
and tax issues arising in connection with mortgage-backed securities, see Gary J. Silversmith, REMICs and
Other Mortgage-Backed Securities, Tax Mgmt. Portfolios (BNA) No. 117 (1996). Regarding the newest
entity, the Financial Asset Securitization Trust (FASIT), approved in the Small Business Job Protection Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1867 (codified at IR.C. § 860H-L (1997)), see 82 FED. RESERVE
BULL. at A-113 to A-120.
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automobile and equipment debt into separate trusts, and then selling shares in
the trusts.
The asset securitization trust has two major advantages over conventional
financing. First, securitization is thought to lower the costs of some credit.
Securitization separates the particular assets into a trust that is distinct from the
rest of the liabilities of the bank. Because these assets are specialized to a
single recurrent class, they are easier for outside investors and rating agencies
to evaluate than is the bank's general portfolio of assets. These assets are
commonly less risky than the bank as a whole, for reasons that include the
high quality and fixed duration of most of the securitized credits, as well as
various credit-enhancing guarantees from the originator or other contractual
parties. Investors in the trust accept lower interest rates, commensurate with
the reduced risk, thereby lowering the cost of capital.
In addition to this lowered cost of funds, the other great advantage to the
trust form 9 for these transactions is that, in the jargon of the financial
community, asset securitization trusts are "bankruptcy remote."5, In the
traditional, bank-intermediated pattern of financing the credits, when the bank
borrowed from the lender, the lender was a mere creditor of the bank, exposed
to default risk in the event that the bank became insolvent. Under the regime
of asset securitization, however, the investor is no longer a lender to the bank
but rather the owner of a beneficial interest in a distinct pool of trust assets.
Should the bank that originates the trust become insolvent, the trust and its
shareholders would not be affected.
C. Corporate Trust Functions Under the Trust Indenture Act
Under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,5' most debt securities issued in
the United States are required to provide for the services of a corporate
fiduciary to act as trustee for the bondholders or other obligees. The
magnitudes are large. The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
estimates that as of year-end 1994 corporate trust departments served as
indenture trustees for just over $3 trillion in debt.52 The 1939 Act
standardized a pattern of trust usage that had developed in financial practice
across the previous century.53 Unlike a conventional private trust, and unlike
the various forms of commercial trust that I have previously discussed-that
is, pension and investment trusts-under a bond indenture the trustee has less
responsibility for the trust property. "The fundamental characteristic of the
49. Securitization can take the form of a share company owning the assets, but the trust form is
thought to bring superior protection against the risk of insolvency of the bank or other onginator.
50. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L. 1. 23-30 (1996)
51. Pub. L. No. 76-253, 53 Stat. 1149 (1939) (codified at 15 US.C § 77aaa (1994))
52. See TRUST ASSETS, supra note I1, at 98 tbl.CI-A.
53. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 8, § 250.
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ordinary personal trust is possession by the trustee of a specific trust res that
he or she holds and administers for the benefit of" the beneficiaries, whereas
"[t]he trustee under a corporate indenture... has no possession, or right to
possession, of the mortgaged property until after a default occurs.""4 The
indenture trustee "has no control of the business of the obligor ... nor, except
for infrequent and unusual circumstances, any voice in the management of its
affairs. 55 The trustee under a bond indenture acts primarily under the terms
of the contract creating the relationship, and acquires actual possession of the
particular assets only in the event that the issuer breaches the covenants of the
loan agreement. The indenture regime imposes, therefore, a species of
contingent or standby trusteeship.
56
What commends the trust form for these corporate and municipal bond
transactions is the ability to have a sophisticated financial intermediary-that
is, a trust company-act on behalf of numerous and dispersed bondholders in
the event that a loan transaction does not work out routinely. The indenture
trustee overcomes the coordination problem that inheres in widespread public
ownership of debt securities. The trust form also starts from the well-developed
platform of trust fiduciary law, which specifies the duties of the trustee. The
1939 indenture legislation tailors the background norms of trust fiduciary law
to the indenture setting.5
7
D. Regulatory Compliance Trusts
The next stop on my tour of commercial trusts is a category I call the
"regulatory compliance trust," a trust created primarily for the purpose of
discharging responsibilities imposed by law.5 My examples are illustrative
54. ROBERT I. LANDAU, CORPORATE TRusT: ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT 25 (4th ed. 1992).
Landau, author of the leading text on trust indenture practice, explains the trustee's role:
[Tihe essential function of [such] a trustee is the administration of the security provisions of a
contract between the issuing corporation and the holders of the indenture securities....
... [If the issue is secured in any way, the trustee holds and deals with the security..
[For example, i]f the security for the bond issue is personal property, such as equipment, the
trustee will normally "perfect" its security interest in the property by filing a financing statement
pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code of the applicable state.
... [A]s administrator of the contract, the trustee has the responsibility of making sure
that the covenants and other indenture provisions are performed in the agreed manner...
... [I]n the event of default the trustee has a primary responsibility for enforcing the
remedial provisions of the contract.
Id at 54.
55. Id. at 25.
56. Hence, a commentator can ask the question posed in Martin D. Sklar, The Corporate Indenture
Trustee: Genuine Fiduciary or Mere Stakeliolder?, 106 BANKINO U. 42 (1989). See also Martin Riger,
The Trust Indenture as Bargained Contract: The Persistence of Myth, 16 J. CORP. L. 211 (1991).
57. See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 §§ 315-318, 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo-rrr (1994).
58. Two of the categories of commercial trust noticed earlier can be said to straddle this category. The
bond issue (under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939) and the pension trust (pursuant to federal pension, tax,
and labor law) now require the trust form, but these varieties of commercial trust appeared in practice
before regulation mandated them. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33, 53.
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only; anyone who cares to comb the statute books and the administrative
sources can find others. Indeed, pressure to use the trust form as a regulatory
compliance device is also seen in the realm of personal trusts. Congress has
designed the transfer tax system to make use of the so-called "bypass" or
"credit shelter" trust all but irresistible in estate planning for spouses with
sufficient means.59
1. Nuclear Decommissioning Trusts
Federal law requires that when a public utility builds a nuclear power
plant, the utility must make future provision for the costs of
"decommissioning" the plant at the end of its safe period of use. The
regulation invites the utility to save for the costs of removing the plant from
service and dismantling it safely through the device of a "nuclear plant
decommissioning trust fund."6O The Internal Revenue Code contains a special
provision t granting a current income tax deduction for the money contributed
to the trust, even though the contributed funds will be invested and not
expended for years to come.
2. Environmental Remediation Trusts
To facilitate tax exemption for compliance with environmental laws that
require the cleanup of waste sites and the like, the Internal Revenue Service
has by rule authorized the creation under state law of so-called environmental
remediation trusts. The Service explains that the primary purpose of such a
trust is "environmental remediation of an existing waste site and not the
carrying on of a profit-making business."' 2 The regulation envisages creation
of such a trust "to resolve, satisfy, mitigate, address, or prevent the liability or
potential liability ... imposed by federal, state, or local environmental
laws."63
3. Liquidating Trusts
It may also be useful to view the so-called liquidating trust, which is a
staple of tax practice in corporate dissolutions, as a species of regulatory
compliance trust. Assets in liquidation can escape entity-level taxation when
59. The bypass trust avoids taxation in the decedent's estate by utilizing the unified credit, currently
$600,000, see I.R.C. § 2010 (1994), and it avoids taxation in the surviving spouse's estate by limiting the
spouse to an income interest that expires on the spouse's death.
60. 18 C.F.R. § 35.32(a) (1994).
61. See I.R.C. § 468A (1994).
62. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-4(e)(1) (1996); see also Wiliam P Streng. Choice of Enrly. Tax Mgmt-
Portfolios (BNA) No. 700, at A-16 (1993) (reviewing regulations).
63. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-4(e)(1).
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placed in trust. However, the Internal Revenue Service cautions, if the
liquidation is unreasonably prolonged or if the liquidation purpose becomes so
obscured by business activities that the declared purpose of the liquidation can
be said to be lost or abandoned,' entity-level tax treatment may result. When
assets are segregated in a liquidating trust, the tax authorities are better able
to monitor the claim that the assets are being deployed in a dissolution mode.
4. Prepaid Funeral Trusts
State governments require regulatory compliance trusts in a variety of
settings. For example, many states regulate the sale of prepayment plans for
funeral services, requiring that the proceeds paid in advance under contract for
funeral services and related merchandise be placed in trust until the death that
occasions the mortician's performance of the contract. 65
5. Foreign Insurers' Trusts
Many state insurance codes require foreign insurers to place assets within
the United States to back up the insurers' American risks.6 The statutes
allow an insurer to deposit these assets with the state insurance commissioner
or to place the assets in trust with an American trust company. The
Massachusetts act, for example, requires the assets to be placed "in exclusive
trust for the benefit and security of all [the insurers'] policyholders and
creditors in the United States. 67 The National Association of Insurance
Commissioners sponsors a model act to facilitate this species of regulatory
trust.68
6. Law Office Trust Account
Another prominent species of regulatory compliance trust arising in
response to state law is the trust account that a law firm operates in order to
discharge its duty to safekeep clients' funds.69 Comparable requirements exist
64. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-4(d) (1996); see also Streng, supra note 62, at A-15 (reviewing
regulations and discussing patterns of use). For a recent case holding that a liquidating trust could not
escape coverage under the Coal Act, 26 U.S.C. § 9701-22 (1994), and rejecting the trust's claim that it was
no longer "in business" under the terms of the Act, see Lindsey Coal Mining Co. v. Chater, 90 F.3d 688,
692 (3d Cir. 1996).
65. See, e.g., 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/1 (West Supp. 1996); IND. CODE § 30-2-10-2 to -3 (1989).
66. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-3-14 (1975); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 4-106 (1997); OKLA. STAT, tit.
36, § 613 (1990).
67. MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 175, § 155 (Law. Co-op. 1996); accord, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1583(d),
1596(c) (West 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 514 (1996); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 613(B)(3).
68. See STATE OF ENTRY MODEL LAw §§ 3(A)(2), 4, 5 (National Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs 1993).
69. On the lawyer's duty to segregate client funds and prevent commingling with personal funds, see
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEOAL ETHIcS § 4.8, at 175-84 (1986). In addition to trust law remedies,
the lawyer's duty is enforced by means of disciplinary sanctions. See generally Debra T. Landis,
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elsewhere in state law, for example, for real estate brokers who handle client
funds.°
E. Remedial Trusts
Remedial trusts are created to settle or to resolve disputes in judicial or
administrative proceedings. The Internal Revenue Code was amended in 1986
to facilitate such trusts.7' Section 468B authorizes the creation of an entity
called the "designated settlement fund," or DSF, which in practice utilizes the
trust form.72 Congress envisioned the DSF as a vehicle for "resolving and
satisfying present and future claims ... arising out of personal injury, death
or property damage. '73 The DSF "primarily grew out of asbestos cases and
other toxic tort litigation. 74 Since 1993, Treasury regulations have permitted
the use of the settlement trust in certain environmental and other nontort
cases.75 The court order that creates the trust embodies the terms of the
settlement agreement.
The DSF is, in large measure, tax-driven. It allows the defendant who pays
into the fund to overcome the constructive receipt doctrine, which would
ordinarily prevent the taxpayer from obtaining a current income tax deduction
for a payment made as a business expense unless the payee recognizes current
income.7' A defendant who pays into a DSF obtains the current deduction
even though the fund may hold the proceeds for some years before making
distribution to the ultimate payees.77
F. Comparing Magnitudes
Having concluded my tour of prominent species of commercial trust, I
want to tote up. Recall the assertion voiced at the outset of this Essay, that in
terms of assets, commercial trusts are far more important than personal trusts.
Annotation, Atorney's Comningling of Client Funds wath Hi. Oun as Ground for Dzucplnar,
Action-Modern Status, 94 A.L.R.3d 846 (1979).
70. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 82.24(l) (West Supp. 1997)
71. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1807(a)(7)(A), 100 Stat 2085. 2814 (1986)
72. I.R.C. § 468B (1994).
73. I.R.C. § 468B(d)(2)(D).
74. William L. Winslow, Resolving Mass Tort with Designated Settlement Funds. TRIAL. Oct 1994.
at 82. Regarding the most prominent examples of mass ton DSFs to date. see Kenneth R Feznbcrg. 77e
Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 LAW & CONTEMP PROBS 79 (1990), and Frank J lMacchiarola. The
Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust: Leasons for the Future. 17 CARDOzo L REv 583 (1996)
75. These trusts are known as "qualified settlement trusts." 26 C FR § I 468B-B 5 (1995)
76. For a general explanation of the constructive receipt doctnne, see 4 BoRIs I BrTTKER, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs 105.2.3 (1981).
77. The pension trust also overcomes the constructive receipt doctrne. because the employer receives
an immediate deduction for contributions to the plan, while the corresponding pension benelits are not fully
paid out until the retirement or death of the worker (and spouse), commonly decades later
1997]
The Yale Law Journal
The data available on the asset values of the various forms of trust has
many shortcomings, but the drift is unmistakable. Begin with personal trusts.
We do not know how much money is held in personal trusts in the United
States. We do have reliable data from the federal regulatory agencies on the
assets held in trust by trust companies and other institutional trustees. As of
year-end 1994, these institutions managed $532 billion of discretionary
personal trust assets, and they held another $140 billion of nondiscretionary
assets (that is, assets managed by outsiders), for a total of $672 billion.7" This
figure may somewhat overstate the assets of strictly personal or family trusts
because it includes assets held in trust by financial institutions for charitable
trusts and foundations. The $672 billion figure understates the total assets held
in personal trusts, however, because it does not include assets held exclusively
by individual (that is, noninstitutional) trustees. The use of individual trustees
is quite common in family wealth transmission, but mostly in smaller trusts.
As a generality to which there certainly are exceptions, I would posit that the
larger the assets of a trust, the more likely it is that the settlor will provide for
an institutional trustee or cotrustee, which would cause the trust to show up in
the federal data that I have reported.
Turning to commercial trusts, recall that I reported pension trust assets at
$4.6 trillion,79 and trust-type mutual funds at perhaps $2 trillion (half the $4
trillion total for all types of mutual funds)."0 To this $6.6 trillion running
total, I then add the $2 trillion in identifiable asset securitization trusts,8'
which takes my total to $8.6 trillion. Next, I add the $3 trillion of trust-
indentured corporate and municipal debt, 2 bringing my tab to $11.6 trillion.
I would need to add some further figures, surely in the hundreds of billions of
dollars, for the values in REITs, in royalty trusts, and in the various regulatory
compliance trusts and remedial trusts. On the other hand, an accurate total
would also require a downward adjustment to correct for instances of double
counting, for example, pension assets that are held in mutual fund shares or in
indenture-backed bonds.
I regret that my data suffers from so many lacunae that it can only be
suggestive. Nevertheless, the data leaves me on solid ground in asserting, as
I did at the outset of this Essay, that well above 90% of the wealth in trust in
the United States is held in commercial as opposed to personal trusts.
78. See TRUST ASSETS, supra note 11, at 9 tbl.A-2.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26 (reporting $3 trillion in trusteed private pension plan
assets and $1.6 trillion in state and local government plans).
80. See supra notes 39-40.
81. See supra text accompanying note 48.
82. See supra text accompanying note 52.
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II. ATTRIBUTES OF THE TRUST THAT INVITE COMMERCIAL USES
What explains the attractiveness of the trust form for modem transaction
planners in the world of commerce? I find it useful to think of the trust as a
competitor, locked in a sort of Darwinian struggle against other modes of
business organization and finance, in particular the corporation, but also the
partnership and the various techniques of secured finance. The challenge is to
understand why the trust prevails when it does.
I shall point to four key attributes of the trust device that entice the
transaction planner: (1) the protection of beneficial interests in the event that
the trustee becomes insolvent; (2) the ease with which the trust lends itself to
favorable, conduit-type taxation; (3) the protective regime of trust fiduciary
law; and (4) the trust's flexibility of design in matters of governance and in the
structuring of beneficial interests.
A. Insolvency Protection
To the planners of commercial transactions, a central attraction of the trust
form is the treatment under trust law of an unusual but most worrisome event,
the insolvency of the trustee. The rule is well-settled that "[a]lthough a trustee
becomes insolvent or bankrupt, the beneficiary retains his interest in the
subject matter of the trust" and, accordingly, the beneficiary "is entitled [to
retain that interest] as against the general creditors of the trustee."' 3 The
conceptual structure of the trust, which treats the trust beneficiaries as the true
owners of the trust property (that is, as the owners of beneficial or equitable
title), supplies the doctrinal justification for this treatment of trustee
insolvency.8
Another foundational principle of trust law, the segregation requirement,
reinforces the insolvency regime by insisting that the trustee make a sharp
distinction between the trustee's own property and the property of the trust.S
Associated rules require trust property to be earmarked appropriately and
forbid the trustee from commingling trust property with the trustee's own
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 12 cmt. f (1959). 1 have elsewhere had occasion to observe
"how central this topic is in the comparative law literature. Europeans. who lack the trust. regard the law
of trustee insolvency as a defining element of the Anglo-American trust, and they find this feature of the
trust perhaps the hardest to replicate in purely contractual arrangements.'" Langbein. supra note 3. at 667-
68. In emphasizing the importance of insolvency protection as a fundamental characteristic of trust law,
I wish to acknowledge my debt to the unpublished paper, Henry Hansmann & Ugo Matter, The
Comparative Law and Economics of Private Trusts 21-25 (Sept. 1995) (unpublished manuscript. on file
with the Yale Law Journal), which contrasts the advantages of the insolvency protection under the Anglo-
American trust with the devices available in European legal systems.
84. "The beneficiary of a trust has the beneficial interest in the trust property.- whereas a creditor of
a trustee "has merely a personal claim against the debtor." RESTATEiENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 12 cmt.
85. See id. § 179.
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property.86 This segregation regime separates the trustee's trust property from
nontrust property without having to lodge ownership of the trust property in
a distinct entity endowed with juridical personality, such as a corporation. 7
In the pension trust, for example, the segregation requirement forces the
employer or other sponsor of a pension plan to recognize that the plan's assets
belong to the plan participants, even when the employer continues to manage
the assets.88
Consider how the insolvency regime functions in the pension trust to
protect pension beneficiaries against employer insolvency. Were the pension
promise merely a liability of the firm, as it is in some European systems, 9
the employee or retiree would be a creditor like any other. Were the employer
to become insolvent-a common enough occurrence in commercial life-the
pension claims would be exposed to reduction or loss in like measure with the
employer's other debts. Under the trust mechanism, however, the employer
creates and funds a separate trust to defray the pension promises, and the
employer's insolvency need not disrupt the pension plan because the plan's
assets are segregated in the trust. Present and future beneficiaries look to the
trust, not to the bankrupt employer, for payment of their pensions.
B. Conduit Taxation
The trust form invites pass-through or conduit taxation.9" The corporation
86. See id. § 179 cmts, b, d.
87. In conventional trust doctrine, the trustees are the juridical persons who own the trust property,
but subject to their trust duties. This contrast between corporation as entity and trust as personal obligation
has eroded in common parlance. The draft Restatement (Third) of Trusts remarks:
Increasingly, modem common law and statutory concepts and terminology tacitly
recognize the trust as a legal "entity," consisting of the trust estate and the associated fiduciary
relation between the trustee and the beneficiaries. This is increasingly and appropriately
reflected both in language (referring, for example, to a trustee's duties or liability to "the trust")
and in doctrine ....
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996). By way of illustration,
consider the provisions of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act of 1994 that, while authorizing trustees to
delegate investment and management functions to an agent, impose a duty of care that the agent owes "to
the trust." UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9(b), 7B U.L.A. 30 (Supp. 1997). The trustee who complies
with the standards of the Act governing delegation "is not liable to the beneficiaries or to the trust" for the
agent's conduct. Id. § 9(c), 7B U.L.A. 30.
88. ERISA spells out the requirement that "all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in
trust," ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (1994), and ERISA imposes fiduciary responsibilities on anyone
who "exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of [plan] assets," ERISA §
3(21)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (1994).
89. In Germany and elsewhere in Europe, where pension credits are "book reserved" on the employer's
accounts, the employer is required to buy external insurance to protect workers against the risk of employer
default. See JAMES H. SMALHOUT, THE UNCERTAIN RETIREMENT: SECURING PENSION PROMISES IN A
WORLD OF RISK 223-30 (1996); see also EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., PENSION PLAN
TERMINATION INSURANCE: DOES THE FOREIGN EXPERIENCE HAVE RELEVANCE FOR THE UNITED STATES?
31-41 (1979).
90. Subchapter J of the Internal Revenue Code allows a trust to qualify for conduit treatment-that
is, for exemption from taxation-when the trust distributes its income to the beneficiaries, who are taxed
directly on the income. See I.R.C. §§ 641(a), 651, 661 (1994). See generally MARK L. ASCHER, FEDERAL
Secret Life of the Trust
as a juridical entity has attracted entity-level taxation in the American system
of income taxation, resulting in double taxation when the corporation's
shareholders are taxed again on income they derive from corporate distribu-
tions. Because we treat the trustee's ownership of trust property as merely
nominal, with real ownership remaining in the beneficiary, we have tended to
tax trust proceeds at the beneficiary level only. This ability to use the trust
form to avoid entity-level taxation has been a driving force in the growth of
commercial uses of the trust.
Consider, for example, the tax advantages of the pension trust." The
employer obtains a current tax deduction for sums contributed to the pension
trust, even though the employee receives no taxable income until retirement,
which may be years, even decades later.9 2 Furthermore, the pension trust is
exempt from current taxation on its investment income,9 3 and thus investment
gains compound without taxation. Contributions to and earnings of the pension
fund are taxed only when finally distributed to retirees,9" who are commonly
in lower tax brackets than when they were in the work force.
On the other hand, tax-favored treatment need not be an inevitable
functional attribute of the trust in its struggle for turf with the corporate form.
To the contrary, Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code allows comparable
treatment for certain corporations,95 and not all trusts qualify for conduit
taxation." There is a rich literature arguing for complete elimination of the
corporate income tax.97 In 1936 Congress simply extended trust-type conduit
tax treatment to mutual funds organized in corporate form;9" and in 1976 a
similar step was taken to extend trust-type taxation to corporate-form
REITs.99 Thus, the trust form undoubtedly facilitates favorable tax treatment,
but Congress can always even that playing field for other modes of business
organization.
INCOME TAXATION OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES (2d ed. 1996), M CARR FERGUSON ET AL. FEERAL NcoME
TAXATION OF ESTATES, TRUSTS, AND BENEFICIARIES (2d cd. 1993 & Supp. 1996)
91. For summary treatment of the tax advantages of qualified plans, see LNGBEIN & WOLK. supra
note 27, at 149-50; for greater detail, see id. at 147-374. Regarding the nontax reasons for emplo)crs to
sponsor plans, see id. at 30-33.
92. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(9), 404(a)(1) (1994).
93. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994).
94. See I.R.C. § 402(a) (1994).
95. See I.R.C. §§ 1366-76 (1994).
96. See I.R.C. § 641(a) (1994).
97. This literature is extensively canvassed in U S DEPT OF THEth TREASURY. RhPoT OI- THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ON INTEGRATION OF THE INI)IVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEts
TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992).
98. See Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740.49 Star 1648 (1936), see alio Jones et al . supra
note 40, at 448-49.
99. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat 1520 (1976); see also Jones Ct a.
supra note 40, at 453.
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C. Fiduciary Regime
Another trait of the trust form that is of fundamental importance to
transaction planners is that the trust automatically invokes the distinctive
protective regime of trust fiduciary law for safeguarding the interests of
investors or other beneficiaries. Effective management of modem financial
assets usually requires that the trustee be granted extensive powers to transact
with the trust property."' Trust fiduciary law offsets and controls this power,
requiring the trustee to exercise it in the best interests of the trust
beneficiaries.'
There are two great principles of trust fiduciary law: loyalty and prudence.
The duty of loyalty requires the trustee "to administer the trust solely in the
interest of the beneficiaries,"'' 2 hence it forbids the trustee from self-dealing
in the management of trust assets and from engaging in conflict-of-interest
transactions adverse to beneficiaries' interests. The other great principle of trust
fiduciary law, the duty of prudent administration, imposes a reasonableness
norm that places the trustee "under a duty to the beneficiary in administering
the trust to exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would
exercise in dealing with his own property."' 3 Subrules of fiduciary law
abound, implementing the duties of loyalty and prudence in particular settings.
Examples include the duties to invest prudently, to diversify investments, to
keep and render accounts, to preserve trust assets and make them productive,
to enforce and defend claims, and to minimize costs. 14
In the development of American pension law, the ability to adopt and to
adapt this potent fiduciary regime was a central attraction of the trust form.
ERISA was devised in part in reaction to scandals in which congressional
investigators discovered that corrupt labor union leaders had misappropriated
union-sponsored pension and benefit funds.'05
100. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON.
425, 426 (1993).
101. See generally Langbein, supra note 3, at 640-43 (discussing the evolution of fiduciary obligation
as a response to the growth of trustees' powers of management).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959), continued in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 170(1) (1992). The Restatement (Third) slightly revises the text of
section 170(l) but leaves the official comments from the Restatement (Second) in force.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174. The Restatement (Third) applies the prudence norm
to investing and managing the trust assets. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR
RULE § 227. The prudent investing standards of the Restatement (Third) are codified in the UNIF. PRUDENT
INVESTOR ACT, 7B U.L.A. 18 (Supp. 1996), which has thus far been enacted in 19 states; comparable
nonuniform legislation has been enacted in Florida, Illinois, and New York. For detail, see John H.
Langbein, 7he Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641
(1996).
104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS §§ 172-78; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT
INVESTOR RULE § 227(b).
105. The origins of ERISA are discussed in Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?,
in U.S. SEN. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 98TH CONG., THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY
ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 6-25 (1984), substantially reprinted in LANOBEN & WOLK, supra note
27, at 67-78.
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Trust fiduciary law is default law that the parties can alter to their
needs."'6 Often, however, the protections of trust fiduciary law are exactly
what the parties wish to absorb into their transaction. For example, investors
are more likely to buy into the deal when they can rely upon the managers
being bound by conventional fiduciary standards. Furthermore, in certain
commercial trusts, such as pension'07 and indenture trusts,35 supervening
regulatory law has forced the parties to the business deal to incorporate some
or all of the fiduciary regime. In such circumstances the regulatory regime
transforms default law into mandatory law.
D. Flexibility in Design
Transacting parties who employ the trust for commercial purposes appear
to value the flexibility that trust law permits, both in matters of internal
governance and in the creation of beneficial interests. Investment trusts provide
the best examples. Transaction planners designing asset securitization trusts
especially welcome the freedom to carve beneficial interests without regard to
traditional classes of corporate shares. They have manipulated the trust form
to create a dizzying array of so-called tranches,'" each embodied in its own
class of trust security.
Why have so many mutual funds chosen to organize as trusts?" In the
106. Even the duty of loyalty is default law that yields to contrary terms of the trust deal. The
Restatement says:
By the terms of the trust the trustee may be permiued to sell trust property to htmself
individually, or as trustee to purchase property from himself individually, or to lend to himself
money held by him in trust, or otherwise to deal with the trust property on his own account.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(l) cmt. t, discussed in Langbcin. supra note 3. at 659
107. See ERISA § 403(a)(I)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(I)(D) (1994).
108. See 40 U.S.C. § 121 (1994) (precluding exculpation clauses).
109. A tranche is simply a slice of a deal, a payment stream whose expected return increases with its
riskiness. Speaking of collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs). a prevalent form of asset secuntization,
Crawford and Sen report:
Today, most CMOs have a large number of tranches, each geared to a specific customer's
needs. In 1982, one of the earliest CMOs was issued for $50 million: It had two tranches. In
1983, there were eight CMO issues, with a dollar volume of $4,748 million, and an average of
6.6 tranches. In 1992, there were approximately 375 CMOs issued for $188,458 million, with
an average of 17.7 tranches.
GEORGE CRAWFORD & BIDYuT SEN, DERIVATIVES FOR DEcIsION MAKERS 45 (1996). Regarding the design
and administration of tranches in CMOs, see id. at 43-45.
110. For discussion of the advantages of the trust form for a mutual fund. see Jones ct al.. supra note
40, at 452-58. The main disadvantage to the trust form for the mutual fund industry, by comparison with
the corporation, has been the concern that the legal doctrine is not absolutely unambiguous on the question
of whether investors are protected from personal liability for the obligations of the trust, even though no
such liability has ever been imposed. See id. at 439-43. Thus, limited liability, the central trait of the
corporate form, continues to exert a powerful attraction in the competition between corporate and trust
forms. A mutual fund organized as a trust typically contains language in its organizing and disclosure
statements declaring that the shareholders shall not be liable for the obligations of the trust and.
furthermore, indemnifying shareholders from the assets of the trust in the event that the declaration were
to be disregarded. See id. at 441. Delaware's recently enacted business trust act attempts to resolve the
matter by providing that shareholders of a business trust are entitled to the same limitation of personal
liability as shareholders of a business corporation. See DEt.. CODE ANN tit. 12, § 3803(a) (1995); see also
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words of a practitioner's manual, "[T]he business trust eliminates a layer of
regulation, i.e., the state corporation statute."' The flexibility to eliminate
governance procedures that are obligatory under the corporate form has been
one great attraction of the trust form. For example, the trust instrument can be
drafted to dispense with routine shareholder meetings. As a result, the costs of
proxy solicitation and other meeting-related expenses that are mandated under
corporation codes can be eliminated." 2
Another aspect of the flexibility of the trust form that appeals to the
mutual fund industry is the comparative ease in creating and extinguishing trust
shares. The so-called money market funds that burst upon the scene in the
mid-1970s, being quite sensitive to short-term interest-rate fluctuations, are
subject to large variations in the number of outstanding shares. When interest
rates decline, redemptions increase; when rates rise, billions of new shares are
issued. Money market funds prefer the trust form because the trust instrument
can be drafted to allow an unlimited number of shares. Corporate law limits
a company to the maximum number of shares authorized in the corporation's
certificate of incorporation." 3 Increasing that number puts the fund and its
shareholders to the expense of soliciting and obtaining shareholder approvals.
On the other hand, avoiding that expense by having the fund's certificate
authorize some vast number of presently unneeded and unissued shares has a
different drawback: State corporate franchise and filing fees (taxes in effect)
increase with the number of authorized shares."1
4
The trust's inherent flexibility for tailoring beneficial interests and
mechanisms of governance reflects, I think, the origins of the Anglo-American
trust as a donative transfer. If you start with the root principle that the owner
of property has absolute freedom to give it away as he or she pleases,"
5
there seems no basis for interfering with this liberty to make arrangements for
giving the property away less than absolutely-no reason, in other words, for
preventing the donor from tailoring whatever organizational regime the donor
cares to devise for implementing the gift. Compare the corporation, which is
the main competitor of the commercial trust. When the modem business
corporation developed in the nineteenth century, it emerged encumbered with
restrictions of a regulatory character, designed to protect creditors and
infra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
111. Philip H. Newman et al., Legal Considerations in Selecting the Form and Jurisdiction of
Organization of a Mutual Fund, A.L.I.-A.B.A., CONINUING LEGAL EDUC., May 11, 1995, at 21, 23.
112. See id.; see also infra note 133.
113. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(4) (1995).
114. See Jones et al., supra note 40, at 454-55; see also infra note 133. Regarding other minor state
tax advantages to the trust form over the corporate form in Massachusetts, see Jones et al., supra note 40,
at 456-57. The greater flexibility of the trust form has also been noted in connection with its use for REITs:
REIT trusts offer "[g]reater flexibility in ... conferring powers on the trustees," "[1]ow or no franchise
and/or income tax," and flexibility in the issuance of shares. STEPHEN P. JARCHOW, REAL EsTATE
SYNDICATION: SECURITZATION AFTER TAX REFORM § 7.2, at 221 (2d ed. 1988).
115. This freedom, of course, does not include perpetuities and similar dead hand protections.
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shareowners. To be sure, across the twentieth century, the corporate form has
become more permissive," 6 but the commercial trust continues to offer the
transaction planner nearly unlimited flexibility in design." 7 This flexibility
harkens back to the origins of the trust form, in the absolute dominion of
donor over donative property.
III. THE RELATIONS OF PERSONAL AND COMMERCIAL TRUSTS
I conclude this introductory investigation by inquiring about the relations
of the commercial trust and the conventional personal trust.
A. Straddling the Line Between Gratuity and Bargain
The distinction between gratuitous transfer and bargained-for
exchange-that is, between gift and deal-is a fundamental line in Anglo-
American law.' 18 A promise to make a gift is not enforceable," 9 and
different formalities pertain to gifts (delivery) and to contracts (consideration).
Ought it to matter that the commercial trust appears to straddle the two
systems of exchange, gift and bargain? Recall Rudden's account of the trust
as "essentially a gift, projected on the plane of time and so subjected to a
management regime."' 0 The commercial trust, by contrast, although still a
management regime, does not effect a gift. Does it matter that this staple
mechanism of the law of gifts is being put to use in the law of deals?
I have elsewhere made the point that even in the law of donative transfers
the trust functions as a deal, in the sense that what trust law does is to enforce
the trustee's promise to the settlor to carry out the terms of the donative
transfer. 2' Thus, although the typical trust implements a donative transfer, it
embodies a contract-like relationship in the underlying deal between the settlor
and the trustee about how the trustee will manage the trust assets and distribute
them to the trust beneficiaries. The difference between a trust and a third-party
beneficiary contract is largely a lawyers' conceptualism.'22
116. The trend is well summarized in Bernard S. Black. 1, Corporate Law Ttrvial7 A Pohtcal and
Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542 (1990). Some nonwaivablc features of Delaware corporation
law are catalogued in Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandator)- Structure of Corporate Law. 89 COLUt., L REV
1549, 1553 n.16 (1989).
117. This intrinsic flexibility includes the seitlor's power to surrender some or the flexibility-for
example, by restricting the trustee's powers to transact, or by tailonng particular standards for amending
or terminating the trust. Regarding the settlor's power to impose a regime for amending or terminating the
trust, see BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 8, § 1001.
118. See, e.g., JOHN P. DAWSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES 1-3 (1980).
119. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.5. at 69-71 (2d ed. 1990)
120. Rudden, supra note 4, at 610.
121. See Langbein, supra note 3, passim.
122. "[T]he three-cornered relation of seulor, trustee, and Ibeneficiary is] easily explained in the
modem law in terms of a contract for the benefit of a third party.- F H. LAWSON. A COMMON LAWYER
LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 200 (1953). discussed in Langbein, supra note 3. at 628
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When, therefore, we enforce a trust, even the conventional donative or
personal trust, we are already in the realm of contract-like behavior. That is
why not much turns on the distinction between donative and commercial trust.
In the commercial setting, the typical wealth-holder, instead of transferring
property for his widow and orphans, is an investor buying shares in an asset
pool for the investor's own benefit. In either case, the wealth-holder places
property at the trustee's disposal in reliance upon the safeguards of the trust
form.
The key insight is that the great principles of trust fiduciary law, loyalty
and prudence, do not depend upon the transferor's motive, whether making a
gift or doing a deal. Hence nothing of importance is lost by allowing the
commercial trust to straddle the categories of gift and deal. The real advantage,
already observed, from the proximity of gift to deal in the law of
commercial trusts, is the ability of the transaction planner to draw upon that
freedom of design that has so characterized the donative transfer.
Comparative law provides a compelling endorsement of the proposition
that the trust need not be rooted in donative transfers. Outside the Anglo-
American legal systems, the trust is generally unknown, except in Japan. 24
The Japanese have built a trust industry with assets amounting to $2 trillion,
all but exclusively in various forms of commercial trusts, including mutual
funds, real estate development trusts, and various time deposit products."2
Japanese experience shows that it is possible to have a vibrant trust system that
is virtually untouched by donative transfers.
B. Corporation and Trust
The commercial trust, I have said, is locked in a struggle for turf against
competing modes of finance and competing modes of business organization,
especially the corporation. As I have explained, the flexibility of the trust form
has facilitated innovation in enterprise organization.
Innovations pioneered in the trust form sometimes spread through
legislation to the corporation. I have mentioned this phenomenon in connection
with trust-type conduit taxation, which Congress has extended to mutual funds
123. See supra text accompanying notes 109-117.
124. See William F. Fratcher, Trust, in 6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW
(1972) (pamphlet print). Various microstates operating as tax havens have imitated Anglo-American trust
law to facilitate offshore flows. For a compilation of these and other foreign trust laws, see INTERNATIONAL
TRUST LAWS (J. Glasson ed., rev. ed. 1994).
125. The trust "was introduced [into Japan] in 1900 or thereabouts from the United States primarily
to provide a business framework for investment management by trust companies." Makoto Arai & Koichi
Kimura, Financial Revolution and Trust Banks in Japan: Challenges in the Deregulation and
Internationalisation Process, 4 J. INr'L TR. & CORP. PLAN. 67, 68 (1995). "[Tjhe use of trusts for
inheritance purposes is quite rare in Japan." Id. at 68 n.l. Current usage is discussed in Makoto Ara,
Japan, in INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supra note 124, at A21-A23.
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and REITs. 12s Likewise, under the Investment Company Act of 1940, '
Congress made identical fiduciary standards applicable to the managers both
of investment companies and investment trusts."ss
In the 1980s, the state of Maryland, which is home to the T. Rowe Price
firm, one of the largest American mutual fund groups, amended its corporation
law to allow investment companies to ape the flexibility of the commercial
trust in governance. 2 9 A Maryland investment company may now provide
by charter for dispensing with annual meetings' and their attendant proxy
costs, one of the distinctive advantages of trust-type mutual funds. A survey
in the late 1980s found that half of all newly organized mutual funds took the
form of trusts, but that a further 28% were organized as Maryland
corporations.' Once again we see the pattern that commercial trust
innovations are absorbed into corporate practice. But the balance of advantage
is slight, and a counter-trend can also be detected. In 1988, Delaware, long the
home of permissive business corporation laws, enacted a liberal business trust
act.'32 Mutual funds wishing to escape state corporate franchise taxes have
since reorganized themselves as Delaware business trusts.' Sixteen states
126. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
127. Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b. 80a-l to 80a-64,
80b-1 to 80b-21 (1994)).
128. See Jones et al., supra note 40, at 450.
129. See 1987 Md. Laws 242.
130. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-501 (1993).
131. See Jones et al., supra note 40, at 422.
132. See Delaware Business Trust Act, 66 Del. Laws 279 (1988) (codified as amended at DEL CODE
ANN. tiL 12, §§ 3801-3820 (1995 & Supp. 1996)); see also supra note 110. For an overview on the topic.
see Wendell Fenton & Eric A. Mazie, Delaware Business Trusts, in 2 THE DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 25.1-25.12 (R. Franklin Baloti & Jesse A. Finkelstein
eds., Supp. 1997).
133. See, for example, the September 1. 1996. proxy statement of the Van Kampen American Capital
Fund, proposing the conversion of two Texas-based funds from Maryland corporations to Delaware business
trusts:
There are two principal reasons for reorganizing the Maryland Funds in Delaware as
business trusts. The first is to take advantage of certain beneficial aspects of Delaware law with
respect to business trusts. The second reason is to eliminate the payment of an annual Texas
franchise tax by each Maryland Fund.
Delaware law provides that the trustees of a Delaware business trust may authorize for
issuance an unlimited number of shares. Maryland corporate law provides that the articles of
incorporation of a Maryland corporation must set forth the number of shares authorized for
issuance. In addition, Delaware law with respect to business trusts has been specifically drafted
to accommodate the unique corporate governance needs of investment companies and provtdes
that its policy is to give maximum freedom of contract to the trust instrument of a Delaware
business trust. Maryland corporate law, although it contains many provisions specifically
applicable to investment companies, is less customized for use by investment companies.
Each Maryland Fund is subject to Texas franchise tax. A Delaware business trust is not
subject to Texas franchise tax. Consequently, the reorganization into a Delaware business trust
will eliminate the need for each Maryland Fund to pay a Texas franchise tax [which in 1995
amounted to $18,600 for one of the two funds and $7,800 for the otherl.
Van Kampen American Capital Funds, Notice of Joint Annual Meeting of Shareholders 14 (Sept. I. 1996)
(on file with the Yale Law Journal). Similar reasons were given in 1984 when the Fidelity Magellan Fund
converted from a Massachusetts business corporation to a Massachusetts business trust. See Mary Ann
Tynan, Form of Investment Organization: Corporation vs. Massachusetts Business Trust, in LNVEsniENT
The Yale Law Journal
in addition to Delaware have legislation authorizing business trusts. 34
From our understanding that the trust and the corporation are competitors
for organizing commercial activity, it follows that we should in principle be
able to specify why one or the other prevails in a particular setting. I am not
yet able to do this. Sometimes the cumulative weight of the advantages of the
trust form appear unbeatable, as for example in the pension trust. Sometimes,
by contrast, the trust and the corporation seem the closest of substitutes, as in
the case of the mutual fund, where both forms are in current use. We are
reminded that in the world of nonprofit organizations, both the charitable trust
and the charitable corporation have remained in constant use for decades.'"
IV. CONCLUSION: THE COMMERCIAL TRUST IN LEGAL CULTURE
I conclude where I began, with the puzzle of legal culture. The commercial
trust is vastly more important in raw economic terms than the personal trust.
Yet those of us who think of ourselves as trust lawyers often have scant
exposure to commercial trusts, and we have little awareness of their size and
extent. Why is the magnitude of commercial trust practice not appreciated?
Why do we continue to think of the trust as a branch of the law of gifts?
I could point to convenient targets-the first and second Restatements of
Trusts, and Austin W. Scott, the Restatement reporter and treatise writer, who
labored to exclude the subject of the commercial trust from polite discourse in
the United States.'36 If Bogert rather than Scott had been in charge of the
Restatement, 37 the Restatement would have noticed commercial trusts.
A better explanation for the neglect of commercial trusts in our trust
tradition is the relative recency of so many of the commercial uses of the trust.
To be sure, the business trust was already a prominent device for the conduct
COMPANIES 1986, at 55 app. at 66 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 515, 1986)
(reprinting Fidelity Magellan Fund, Inc., Notice of Special Meeting in Lieu of the Annual Meeting of
Shareholders). In 1994, Fidelity converted a group of money market funds from Massachusetts business
trusts to Delaware business trusts, in part because Delaware's statutory business trust law allows fewer
shareholder meetings and a smaller quorum of voting shares. See Karen Blumenthal, Fidelity Sets Vote on
Scope of Investments, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1994, at Cl.
134. See Irving S. Schloss, Some Undiscovered Country: The Business Trust and Estate Planning, 22
TAX MGMT. ESTS. GIFTS & TRs. J. 83, 83 (1997).
135. Among the factors that bear on that choice, the charitable trust can be created more rapidly and
without the risk of publicity attendant to a public filing with the secretary of state for a nonprofit
corporation charter. The corporation is thought to offer superior protection to directors in the event of
liability for tort, because while the liability of a trustee is in theory personal and unlimited, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 402 (1959), the liability of a corporate director is limited to the
assets of the corporation. Similarly, the standard of care for administration of the entity is nominally less
onerous in the case of a corporation-the business judgment rule as opposed to the trust standard of prudent
administration. See generally JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT OROANIZATIONS 61-65
(1995). For historical background on the two forms, see MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND
GOVERNMENT 36-43 (1965).
136. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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of enterprise in the nineteenth century, 31 until the general corporation
statutes made the company form easily available. American competition law
still bears the curious label of "antitrust," a legacy from the monopolists of the
Gilded Age, who organized their firms as trusts. With the routinization of the
corporate form, the trust fell from scholarly attention among business lawyers.
Meanwhile, among trusts and estates lawyers, preoccupied as ever with family
wealth transmission, the commercial trust was distant turf.
The main forms of commercial trust that I have discussed in this Essay
have been twentieth-century inventions. The mutual fund industry was
effectively organized in the 1920s. Indenture trusts took their modem form
with the 1939 legislation. The pension trust was a trickle until after World War
II. REITs appeared in the 1960s, while asset securitization was unimportant
into the 1970s. The ink is hardly dry on the legislation that has called forth
nuclear decommissioning trusts and designated settlement fund trusts.
I should also emphasize that commercial trust practice has grown up in the
hands of specialized bars, out of contact with the trusts and estates bar.
Securities lawyers have nurtured mutual funds, the real estate bar has handled
REITs, pension law was a subspecialty of taxation in most law firms until well
after the enactment of ERISA in 1974, and asset securitization has been
centered in the hands of the banking and commercial transactions bar.
The lack of awareness of commercial trusts among American trust lawyers
thus reflects both the antiquity of the trust in the practice of donative transfers
and the relative recency of so many of the forms of commercial trust. The
ultimate challenge of this intriguing topic is to explain when and why trust
dominates corporation for particular commercial tasks. Although that is
supremely a question for business law scholars, as a trust lawyer I still find it
odd to be admitting that the trust in its most important dimension-as an
instrument of commerce-has become the province of others.
There is no mystery, however, in understanding why the trust appears so
attractive as a commercial form. Although the trust resembles the corporation
in supplying for the particular venture a highly adaptable, contract-like regime
of rights, of fiduciary duties, and of internal governance, the trust offers
investors an insolvency regime superior to that of corporate law, packaged in
a way that facilitates pass-through taxation.
138. Early 20th-century treatises collect the case law. See. e g. WILutA.t C DUNN. TRUSTS FOR
BUSINESS PURPOSES (1922); JOHN H. SEARS, TRUST ESTATES AS BUSINESS CO.MPANtmS (1912). SYDNEY
R. WRIGHTINGTON, THE LAW OF UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS AND SIMILAR RhLATIONS (1916), see
also GuY A. THOMPSON, BUSINESS TRUSTS AS SUBSTITrrES FOR BUSINESS CORPORATIONS (1920),
EDWARD H. WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION (1929)
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